Category: Industry Playbook

The Leaded Gasoline Industry

This is Chapter 27 of my new book, working title “The Industry Playbook: Corporate Cartels, Corruption and Crimes Against Humanity” that is being published online chapter by chapter.


The story of leaded gasoline is far worse than that of cigarettes. But fewer people seem to be aware of any of the details of this escapade of big industry. You and I have lead still in our bones to this day because of the actions of the people shown here.

In 1921, Thomas Midgley Jr., an engineer working at General Motors (GM), discovered that adding tetraethyl lead (TEL) to gasoline improved engine performance by having an anti-knock effect.

Midgley’s boss was Charles Kettering, the head of research at GM. The president and CEO was Alfred P. Sloan. Their names would go on to be best known today as being on the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center. (What goes on there and in the wider cancer industry will be discussed later.)  

It wasn’t just GM involved. By 1920, the du Pont family owned more than 35 percent of GM shares. So Du Pont was intimately involved from the beginning. We’ll also hear more about Du Pont in a later chapter.

Standard Oil of New Jersey was also involved. They merged with Standard Oil of New York becoming what is known today as Exxon, the largest player of the original monopoly of Standard Oil that had been broken up.

These companies and their researchers said that the lead from gasoline wouldn’t harm anyone. Some of them probably believed that was the case. The common refrain, that the amounts used would be too small to hurt anyone, was the company line.

The result was that massive amounts of lead were spread across the entire world through the use of cars and other vehicles.

Jamie Lincoln Kitman won an investigative reporting award for his Nation article on leaded gasoline, which much of this chapter stems from. He will be quoted throughout.

Dangers of Lead

The dangers of lead were already known back when they started using it. Even the ancient Greeks thousands of years ago where aware of what lead could do.

Lead is linked to lower IQ, heart disease, cancer, many other diseases, and even rises in violent crime and other behavioral issues.

It easily contaminants the air, water and soil. This leads to bioaccumulation as it does not break down, being one of the periodic elements. The estimated 7 million tons of lead burned in gasoline are now spread throughout the environment. A 1983 report by Britain’s Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution stated that “it is doubtful whether any part of the earth’s surface or any form of life remains uncontaminated by anthropogenic lead.”

A 1985 EPA study estimated 5,000 Americans died annually from lead-related heart disease before the phase-out occurred.

Leaded gasoline’s eventual USA banning lead to a drop in mean blood-lead levels of 75 percent. Understand that between 1927 and 1987 every single person was exposed to toxic levels of lead. This was most damaging to children, including babies in the womb.

But other countries continued to use it longer. Venezuela sold only leaded gasoline until 1999. Sixty-three percent of newborn children contained levels of lead in excess of the safe levels established by the government there.

An estimated 90% of the lead in the atmosphere is from gasoline. Other areas like mining and lead based paints contribute a minor amount in comparison.

All these dangers were denied and covered up by industry from the very beginning.

They Knew the Dangers of Lead When They Started Using TEL

Tetraethyl lead was first discovered by a German Chemist in 1854. It wasn’t used commercially because of “its known deadliness.” For over sixty years, it had no use until Midgley found one for it.  

In March 1922, a Du Pont executive, Pierre du Pont described TEL as “a colorless liquid of sweetish odor, very poisonous if absorbed through the skin, resulting in lead poisoning almost immediately.”

William Mansfield Clark, lab director in the US Public Health Service, had written the assistant Surgeon General A.M. Stimson when Du Pont’s production first got underway. He said TEL was a “serious menace to public health” and that reports were coming in that “several very serious cases of lead poisoning have resulted” from the plant’s production.

In turn, the US Surgeon General, H.S. Cumming wrote to Pierre du Pont in December 1922, “Inasmuch as it is understood that when employed in gasoline engines, this substance will add a finely divided and nondiffusible form of lead to exhaust gases, and furthermore, since lead poisoning in human beings is of the cumulative type resulting frequently from the daily intake of minute quantities, it seems pertinent to inquire whether there might not be a decided health hazard associated with the extensive use of lead tetraethyl in engines.”

Midgley himself was suffering from lead poisoning in 1923. “After about a year’s work in organic lead I find that my lungs have been affected and that it is necessary to drop all work and get a large supply of fresh air,” he wrote.

Leaded Gasoline was Never Needed, in fact Inferior from the Very Beginning

Not only were the dangers known, but the benefits weren’t even that great. Other additives to gasoline functioned in much the same way, in fact many are superior. Ethanol, better known as alcohol, is used instead of lead today.

Ethanol could be used back then. An article in Scientific American said in 1918 that, “It is now definitely established that alcohol can be blended with gasoline to produce a suitable motor fuel.”

Unfortunately, ethanol had a fatal flaw as far as industry was concerned. It couldn’t be patented. This and other additives were suppressed and smeared by the industry.

In fact, ethanol might have been used to power cars completely without oil involved at all! Kitman wrote, “In 1907 and 1908 the US Geological Survey and the Navy performed 2,000 tests on alcohol and gasoline engines in Norfolk, Virginia, and St. Louis, concluding that higher engine compression could be achieved with alcohol than with gasoline. They noted a complete absence of smoke and disagreeable odors.”

Henry Ford’s Model A car could be adjusted from the dashboard to run on gasoline or ethanol. But this simply wouldn’t do for the growing oil industry.

In 1920, Midgley filed a patent for alcohol and cracked gasoline as antiknock fuel. He told a meeting of the Society of Automative Engineers, “Alcohol has tremendous advantages and minor disadvantages.” The benefits included “clean burning and freedom from any carbon deposit…[and] tremendously high compression under which alcohol will operate without knocking…Because of the possible high compression, the available horsepower is much greater with alcohol than with gasoline.”

Although this process was patented, ethanol itself could not be. Despite its earlier discovery, TEL could be patented, and it would be owned by GM.

That Midgley has earlier patented an alcohol gasoline process would later be denied. In August 1925, Midgley lied to a meeting of scientists, “So far as science knows at the present time, tetraethyl lead is the only material available which can bring about these [antiknock] results, which are of vital importance to the continued economic use by the general public of all automotive equipment, and unless a grave and inescapable hazard rests in the manufacture of tetraethyl lead, its abandonment cannot be justified.” This lie helped to protect the cash cow that TEL became.

TEL was marketed as Ethyl with no mention of lead at all. This is because of the negative connotations that lead justifiably carried. And this named happened to be curiously close to ethanol.

Standard Oil of New Jersey Gets in on the Game

Leaded gasoline swept the nation. So much so that GM couldn’t keep up with production.

In 1924, Standard Oil of New Jersey developed and patented a better manufacturing technology for TEL. They formed a joint venture with GM called the Ethyl Gasoline Corporation.

August of that year, they began production at its Bayway plant in Elizabeth, New Jersey. Du Pont engineers had expressed serious concerns about the safety of this facility. Yet this information was not acted on.

Kitman writes, “On October 26, 1924, the first of five workers who would die in quick succession at Standard Oil’s Bayway TEL works perished, after wrenching fits of violent insanity; thirty-five other workers would experience tremors, hallucinations, severe palsies and other serious neurological symptoms of organic lead poisoning. In total, more than 80 percent of the Bayway staff would die or suffer severe poisoning. News of these deaths was the first that many Americans heard of leaded gasoline–although it would take a few days, as the New York City papers and wire services rushed to cover a mysterious industrial disaster that Standard stonewalled and GM declined to delve into.”

Some other deaths and incidents had occurred at other TEL plants as well earlier, but these were more successfully covered up from public knowledge.

Standard’s medical consultant, J. Gilman Thompson helped to cover it up stating that, “Although there is lead in the compound, these acute symptoms are wholly unlike those of chronic lead poisoning such as painters often have…There is no obscurity whatever about the effects of the poison and characterizing the substance as ‘mystery gas’ or ‘insanity gas’ is grossly misleading.”

These events led to Philadelphia, Pittsburgh and all of New Jersey banning leaded gasoline. Meanwhile, it continued to be sold elsewhere.

Regulating the Regulators

To help with the coverup, GM contracted the US Bureau of Mines to investigate the deaths. “Even by the lax standards of its day, the bureau was a docile corporate servant, with not an adversarial bone in its body. It saw itself as in the mining promotion business, with much of its scientific work undertaken in collaboration with industry,” writes Kitman.

The Ethyl Gasoline Corporation had veto power over what this agency wrote, the contract stating, “before publication of any papers or articles by your Bureau, they should be submitted to them for comment, criticism, and approval.”

In November 1924, the Bureau of Mines report was released. It only contained limited animal testing which found no problems with TEL.

The New York Times ran with the front-page headline “No Peril to Public Seen in Ethyl Gas/Bureau of Mines Reports after Long Experiments with Motor Exhausts/More Deaths Unlikely.”

This report and the surrounding press not only helped to allay fears of dangers to workers, but the overall danger of leaded gasoline.

Yandell Henderson of Yale attacked the report quite presciently. That while they had “investigated the danger to the public of acute lead poisoning,” they had, “failed even to take into account the possibility that the atmosphere might be polluted to such an extent along automobile thoroughfares that those who worked or lived along such streets would gradually absorb lead in sufficient quantities to poison them in the course of months.” Eventually, “conditions will grow worse so gradually and the development of lead poisoning will come on so insidiously (for this is the nature of the disease) that leaded gasoline will be in nearly universal use and large numbers of cars will have been sold that can run only on that fuel before the public and the Government awaken to the situation.” In a summation that describes American policy quite well he wrote, “This is probably the greatest single question in the field of public health that has ever faced the American public. It is the question whether scientific experts are to be consulted, and the action of Government guided by their advice, or whether, on the contrary, commercial interests are to be allowed to subordinate every other consideration to that of profit.”

Still, such incidents led to the voluntary withdrawal of Ethyl for a limited time in May 1925. But this may have been part of its public relations strategy and nothing more.

Further investigation would take place. Charles Kettering himself, as well as executives from Standard and Du Pont paid a private visit in 1924 to Surgeon General Hugh Smith Cumming. They requested the Public Health Service investigate TEL, holding private hearings.

This special committee found “no good grounds” for prohibiting leaded gasoline in January 1926. Their report found, “So far as the committee could ascertain all the reported cases of fatalities and serious injuries in connection with the use of tetraethyl lead have occurred either in the process of manufacture of this substance or in the procedures of blending and ethylizing.”

The New York Times once again helped to spread this corporate-friendly message with a headline, “Report: No Danger in Ethyl Gasoline.”

But to actually dive into the report you would find more troubling details, echoing what Henderson had said earlier. “It remains possible that if the use of leaded gasolines becomes widespread, conditions may arise very different from those studied by us which would render its use more of a hazard than would appear to be the case from this investigation. Longer experience may show that even such slight storage of lead…may lead eventually in susceptible individuals to recognizable or to chronic degenerative diseases of a less obvious character… In view of such possibilities the committee feels that the investigation begun under their direction must not be allowed to lapse…The vast increase in the number of automobiles throughout the country makes the study of all such questions a matter of real importance from the standpoint of public health, and the committee urges strongly that a suitable appropriation be requested from Congress for the continuance of these investigations under the supervision of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service.”

With this the committee passed a resolution calling for further studies. However, no further studies were conducted. The Surgeon General never asked Congress for more money. For the next forty years all research was exclusively conducted by the industry. And TEL production began once again.

The Surgeon General would continue to act in favorable ways to the industry. “Foreshadowing years of sterling service on behalf of Ethyl, the Surgeon General, the nation’s highest-ranking medical officer, would put pen to paper again in 1928, encouraging New York City sanitary officials to lift the city’s ban on the use of TEL-laced gasoline,” writes Kitman. “In 1931 Cumming would further assist Ethyl’s overseas marketing efforts…the Surgeon General would busy himself writing letters of introduction for Ethyl officials to public health counterparts in foreign countries.”

No direct financial links were mentioned in Kitman’s writing or other sources that were looked at, but the chances are that they were there. By his actions the Surgeon General was clearly allied to the industry rather than public health.

The FTC Restrains…the Competition

In 1936, TEL dominated 90 percent of the gasoline market. Yet, Cushing Gasoline started advertising their TEL free gasoline with ads that read, “It stands on its own merits and needs no dangerous chemicals–hence you can offer it to your customers without doubt or fear.”

As a result of this, and whatever backroom deals that must surely have taken place, the Federal Trade Commission stepped in to help Ethyl continue to monopolize. They issued a restraining order to prevent competitors from criticizing leaded gasoline in their advertising.

Their order read that Ethyl gasoline, “is entirely safe to the health of motorists and the public…and is not a narcotic in its effect, a poisonous dope, or dangerous to the life or health of a customer, purchaser, user or the general public.”

The FTC’s mission is to protect consumers from misleading advertising. Yet here we see them do exactly the opposite in protecting monopoly interests.

Lead Science

The top lead industry scientist was a man named Robert Kehoe. He was appointed as the chief medical consultant of the Ethyl Corporation in 1925. He worked there until he retired in 1958. That’s 33 years of dedicated industrial science. He was also appointed as the director of the Kettering Laboratory, funded by GM, Du Pont and Ethyl.

At a Senate committee in 1966, Kehoe said, “at present, this Laboratory is the only source of new information on this subject [occupational and public health standards for lead] and its conclusions have a wide influence in this country and abroad in shaping the point of view and the activities, with respect to this question, of those who are responsible for industrial and public hygiene.”

He further told them that they “had been looking for 30 years for evidence of bad effects from leaded gasoline in the general population and had found none.”

His findings were backed by some of the top authorities like the American Public Health Association and the American Medical Association.

After the Surgeon General’s committee, zero public science was done. The leaded gasoline industry not only had a monopoly on the product, but also a complete monopoly on the science at this point, all of it running through Kehoe’s lab. And it was shoddy industry science with a pre-conceived outcome.

Kitman writes, “In fact, independent researchers later realized, Kehoe’s control patients–the ones who wouldn’t be exposed to leaded gas in his studies–were invariably already saturated with lead, which had the effect of making exposed persons’ high lead load appear less worrisome.” These uncontrolled controls would be a mainstay of industry science. It’s a great way to show that whatever you’re looking at has no impact.

Other industry-funded associations would help to propagate such industry-friendly research. These groups included the Lead Industries Association and the International Lead Zinc Research Organization.

Leveraged Buyout

TEL’s patents expired in 1947. Yet the profits were large enough to be spread by all the top players in the industry.

In 1963, the Ethyl corporation’s annual report stated, “today, lead alkyl antiknock compounds are used in more than 98 percent of all gasoline sold in the United States and in billions of gallons more sold in the rest of the world. Leaded gasoline is available at 200,000 service stations in this country and thousands of others around the globe.”

Yet GM had decided to get out of the leaded gasoline business. This may have been due to antitrust issues that were being looked at. More likely this had to do with much debated at the time air pollution regulation that they saw coming.

Kitman writes, “American auto makers saw the threat that air pollution posed to their business. In the mid-fifties they’d concluded a formal but secret agreement among themselves to license pollution-control technologies jointly and not publicize discoveries in the area without prior approval of all the signatories, a pre-emptive strike against those who would pressure them to install costly emissions controls.”

So in 1962, GM and Standard Oil sold off Ethyl Gasoline Corporation, their leaded gasoline subsidiary, to Albemarle Paper.

After that they turned against their former product that had made them rich. A biographer for GM would write, “Here was General Motors, which had fathered the additive, calling for its demise! And it struck some people as incongruous–not to use a harsher word–for General Motors to sell half of what was essentially a lead additive firm for many millions and then to advocate annihilation of the lead antiknock business.”

In 1969, the Justice Department accused the four major auto companies, including GM, their trade association, and seven other manufacturers of conspiracy for the above-mentioned secret agreement. There’s that conspiracy word again. This suit was settled that September.

Anti-Lead Science Strengthened and the Ensuing Bribes, Threats and Actions

Meanwhile, the science regarding the dangers of lead was growing ever stronger.

Dr. Clair Patterson, a California Institute of Technology geochemist, had worked on the Manhattan Project and was widely credited with estimating the earth’s age of 4.55 billion years. He was considered a scientist beyond reproach.

In 1965 he published, “Contaminated and Natural Lead Environments of Man,” in the Archives of Environmental Health. This detailed how industry had raised lead levels 100 times in the earth and 1000 times in the atmosphere.” While lead was natural, it’s widespread dispersal had been caused by man.

Patterson said, “It is not just a mistake for public health agencies to cooperate and collaborate with industries in investigating and deciding whether public health is endangered–it is a direct abrogation and violation of the duties and responsibilities of those public health organizations.”

Ethyl sent representatives who according to Patterson, tried to “buy me out through research support that would yield results favorable to their cause.”

The pushback is always multi-pronged. His longstanding contract with the Public Health Service was not renewed. The American Petroleum Institute also failed to renew a contract Patterson had with them.

Kitman writes, “Members of the board of trustees at Cal Tech leaned on the chairman of his department to fire him. Others have alleged that Ethyl offered to endow a chair at Cal Tech if Patterson was sent packing.”

Phasing Out Lead in Gasoline in the USA

Interestingly enough, it wasn’t the health issues that caused it to go away, but tailpipe emissions. The Clean Air Act of 1970 led to catalytic converters being required for strict emission regulations. Lead damaged catalytic converters.

Within the USA, the EPA acted in 1973 to phase out leaded gasoline. New vehicles were designed to run on unleaded gasoline.

When this was announced the EPA was sued by Ethyl and Du Pont, that they were deprived of their property rights. The US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia said that the EPA’s lead regulations were “arbitrary and capricious.”

Up the chain of courts it went. In 1976, this decision was overturned because of the “significant risk” involved. Ethyl, Du Pont, Nalco and PPG, as well as the National Petroleum Refiners Association and four oil companies appealed to the Supreme Court but they refused to hear it. (Interestingly enough, Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell had been an Ethyl director.)

An intensive lobbying campaign was launched to delay the lead phaseout. This was led by Du Pont, Monsanto and Dow.

With all of this industry-led pushback, as with most regulation when it occurs, it was a slow-moving plan.

California led the way banning leaded gas in 1992. Leaded gasoline wasn’t fully banned within the USA until 1996 for passenger cars.

Increasing Lead Worldwide

By 1979 Ethyl found, “It is worth noting that during the second half of 1979, for the first time, Ethyl’s foreign sales of lead antiknock compounds exceeded domestic sales.” With increasing regulation in the USA, the strategy of going worldwide would become more prevalent.

When the USA had finally banned leaded gasoline in all passenger cars in 1996, other countries were far behind. The percentage of leaded gasoline sold included:

  • 93% Africa
  • 94% Middle East
  • 30% Asia
  • 35% Latin America

Not only that, but additional steps would be taken to ensure that profits remained high. In other countries the industry would help to get even more lead added to gasoline. This was of no benefit except to their bottom line. India more than doubled how much lead was in its gasoline, from 0.22 to 0.56 grams per liter.

Another big leaded gasoline company was Octel. They reported in a 1998 SEC filing, “From 1989 to 1995, the Company was able to substantially offset the financial effects of the declining demand for TEL through higher TEL pricing. The magnitude of these price increases reflected the cost effectiveness of TEL as an octane enhancer as well as the high cost of converting refineries to produce higher octane grades of fuel.”

Certain imports and exports only made sense in light of profit motives. “Ironically, in the nineties the Venezuelan state oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela, exported unleaded gasoline. But it was importing TEL and adding it to all gasoline sold for domestic use,” reports Kitman. “By way of explanation, it is perhaps not unhelpful to know that several high-ranking officials of the state oil company held consultancies with companies that sell lead additives to the country.”

Phasing Out Lead Worldwide

In 2002, the United Nations Environment Programme launched an effort to stop worldwide use of leaded gasoline. Most countries started on this immediately, but some countries did not. This included Algeria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Myanmar, and North Korea.

Rob de Jong, the head of UNEP’s sustainable transport unit, said “In some of these countries, officials were bribed by the chemical industry that was producing these additives…They were bribed to buy large stockpiles.”

Finally, in 2021 lead in gasoline was banned and phased out completely for passenger vehicles across the world. Algeria was the final country to stop using it.

However, while leaded gasoline is no longer used worldwide for passenger cars, it is still used for other vehicles, including some aircraft, motorsports, farm equipment, marine engines and off-road vehicles. This includes in the USA.  

Diversification

Despite the problems, Ethyl continued to thrive. By 1983 they had become the world’s largest producer of organo-metallic chemicals. In addition to expansion into the petroleum industry, they would expand into specialty chemicals, plastics, aluminum, oil, gas, coal, pharmaceuticals, biotech research, semiconductors and life insurance.

Ethyl’s 1996 annual report shared their “long-running strategy: namely, using Ethyl’s significant cash flow from lead antiknocks to build a self-supporting major business and earnings stream in the petroleum additives industry.”

Ethyl Corporation, as a subsidiary of NewMarket Corporation, is still going strong. They’re making total revenues of over $2 billion per year.

Erik Millstone of the Science and Technology Policy Research Unit at Sussex University reviewed all the scientific evidence on lead exposure in 1997. He found that children where four to five times as susceptible to the effects of lead as adults.

The good news is that lead levels fell rapidly when leaded gasoline was no longer used.

Still, these dangerous effects wouldn’t be completely eliminated. A 1992 article in The New England Journal of Medicine compared pre-Columbian inhabitants of North America to those living in the present day. The authors found that the average blood-lead levels were 625 times lower earlier in history.

Rabinowitz in an article for Environmental Health Perspectives, states “Bone lead levels generally increase with age at rates dependent on the skeletal site and lead exposure. The slow decline in blood lead, a 5- to 19-year half-life, reflects the long skeletal half-life.”

What this means is that because of leaded gasoline in the past, you and I still have lead in our bones. The sins of the fathers…

Key Takeaways on The Leaded Gasoline Industry

  • Lead was used in gasoline for its antiknock effects. It was already known to be poisonous at the time, and there already were better alternatives, especially ethanol. But it had a fatal flaw for the industry, it wasn’t patentable.
  • Leaded gasoline would aerolize lead getting it in the air, soil and water. Their pollution affected every single man, woman and child the world over causing cancer, neurodegeneration, cardiovascular problems and more. It is especially dangerous to developing children. No one was immune.
  • The companies behind these actions were General Motors, Du Pont, and the various Standard Oil spin offs (nowadays ExxonMobil).
  • The man who invented tertraethyl lead’s use in gasoline himself suffered from lead poisoning. To prove its safety, he would literally rub it into his skin at exhibitions. He had previously patented an ethanol gasoline method but this wasn’t as profitable so GM never used it and would later claim there were no alternatives.
  • The US Surgeon General Hugh S. Cumming was effectively in the pocket of the industry. He helped to cover up deaths from lead poisoning, expanding the reach of the industry to the worldwide market, and doing no further research on the risks of lead gasoline. With no research the industry could claim there was no research to show it had risks.
  • There were other friends in high places. The FTC put a restraining order on competitors saying leaded gasoline “is entirely safe to the health of motorists and the public.” No competitors could bring up the health dangers.
  • The New York Times, for one reason or another provided cover for the industry including the front-page headline: “Report: No Danger in Ethyl Gasoline,” even though the report discussed the need for more research and longer term potential issues.
  • Robert Kehoe was the chief medical consultant of the Ethyl Corporation (formed by GM and Standard Oil). In front of Congress in 1966 he said that he “had been looking for 30 years for evidence of bad effects from leaded gasoline in the general population and had found none.” In his research his control patients already had lead exposure thus leading to the outcomes desired by the industry.
  • Dr. Clair Patterson, a California Institute of Technology geochemist, onetime member of the Manhattan Project published in 1965 “Contaminated and Natural Lead Environments of Man.” This found how industry had raised his lead burden 100 times and levels of atmospheric lead 1,000 times. The industry attempted to buy him out, had other scientific contracts canceled and tried to get him fired.
  • Many countries began banning leaded gasoline. The USA started in the 1980’s. The last country in the world, Algeria, finally did so in 2021.
  • However, leaded gasoline is only banned in passenger cars. Leaded gasoline is still used in some aircraft, motorsports, farm equipment, marine engines and off-road vehicles including in the USA. 

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Johnson & Johnson’s Asbestos Baby Powder

This is Chapter 26 of my new book, working title “The Industry Playbook: Corporate Cartels, Corruption and Crimes Against Humanity” that is being published online chapter by chapter.


Since we just covered the topic of asbestos, I figured it was worth discussing a more contemporary example that involves such.

Johnson & Johnson is a big company. They were ranked 36 in 2021 on the Fortune 500 list, as one of the largest US corporations.

In addition, J&J has been held up as one of the most honest corporations. Back in 1982, Tylenol was its biggest seller, representing one third of its profit. When someone replaced capsules inside the bottle with one’s laced with cyanide in Chicago, seven people died.

J&J immediately went to the media to tell people to stop taking their product. They issued a nationwide recall to determine the extent of the problem. This is regarded as one of the great cases of a corporation doing the right thing, at tremendous cost to itself. They acted to save the public and they bounced back quickly because of doing so. Plus, to prevent future problems tamper-proof bottles were invented and rolled out.

I applaud the leadership in charge at that time. However, that doesn’t mean everything they do or did was squeaky clean. In fact, you’ll see that while that event went on, they were busy covering up another deadly crime, just one with a longer time horizon.

J&J’s baby powder was launched in 1894. Late in 2019, J&J recalled 33,000 bottles of its baby powder. The FDA found asbestos inside. J&J claimed they had stringent tests, never found asbestos, and that it was safe. Here’s a PR piece put out in newspapers after some of the initial lawsuits against them for this gained traction in 2018.

Some of the blatant lies, as you’ll come to see from court discovery reads:

  • “It doesn’t contain asbestos and never will.”
  • “The FDA has tested Johnson’s talc since the ‘70’s and has confirmed – every single time – that it did not contain asbestos.”
  • “We did not hide anything. Ever.”
  • “We have always acted with the utmost transparency in this matter.”
  • “There is irrefutable scientific evidence that our talc is safe and beneficial to use.”

The PR website FactsAboutTalc.com continues the spin.

After all, if you’re giving babies cancer that won’t be developed for many years, lying about it is easy enough to do.

Here are the actual facts. Concerns had been raised back as early as 1971 and many times since.

New York Times reported “An executive at Johnson & Johnson…recommended to senior staff in 1971 that the company ‘upgrade’ its quality control of talc. Two years later, another executive raised a red flag, saying the company should no longer assume that its talc mines were asbestos-free…In hundreds of pages of memos, executives worried about a potential government ban of talc, the safety of the product and a public backlash over Johnson’s Baby Powder, a brand built on a reputation for trustworthiness and health.”

Discovery from civil litigation showed what was known and when.

In this case, they covered it up every possibly way they could. In 1976, Arthur Langer at the Mount Sinai Medical Center found asbestos in talcum powders. The president of Mount Sinai issued a news release to say that these were older powders and new ones were safe, though that wasn’t the case.

Why did the president do this? Mount Sinai received funding from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, started in the early 1970’s with $1.2 billion of J&J stock. J&J CEO Philip Hofmann also served on the foundation board. Philanthropy obviously can be used for good…and philanthropy can also be used for power and control to protect profits. This is another industry playbook tactic that we’ll dive deeper into later.

J&J put pressure on the FDA to not release what it deemed “untrue information”. This despite scientists reporting “incontrovertible asbestos,” or asbestos fiber counts that “seemed rather high.” They pressed the FDA to use a subpar method that wouldn’t detect amounts under 1%, which FDA officials were okay with. Controlling regulation is straight out of the playbook too.  

In 1974, Johnson & Johnson told the FDA that, “…if the results of any scientific studies show any question of safety of talc, Johnson & Johnson will not hesitate to take it off the market.” This was a lie to the regulators.

An internal J&J memo, marked strictly confidential, from a research director, says how science was to be handled. “Our current posture with respect to sponsorship of talc safety studies has been to initiate studies only as dictated by confrontation. This philosophy, so far, has allowed us to neutralize or hold in check data already generated by investigators who question the safety of talc. The principal advantage for this operating philosophy lies in the fact that we minimize the risk of possible self-generation of scientific data which may be politically or scientifically embarrassing.”

The facts were that the earliest reports come from 1957 and 1958. An Italian mine which J&J used for production was found to contain 1 to 3 percent contamination.

This coverup continued. Reuters reported, “An early 1970s study of 1,992 Italian talc miners shows how it worked: J&J commissioned and paid for the study, told the researchers the results it wanted, and hired a ghostwriter to redraft the article that presented the findings in a journal.”

Some of their own scientists proposed a simple solution. Switch from talc to corn starch. Why didn’t they? Talc was cheaper.

This was just a small sampling of the 60 plus year conspiracy and coverup of known but subtle dangers by one of the largest and most successful companies around. We’ll see more of J&J’s crimes, specifically surrounding the opioid epidemic, later on in the section on pharmaceuticals.

How have these court cases ended?

Johnson & Johnson has stopped selling its talc powder. But only in the USA and Canada. Other countries will continue to receive it. That’s the going worldwide strategy once again.

The company decided to stop selling “in large part to changes in consumer habits and fueled by misinformation around the safety of the product and a constant barrage of litigation advertising.” They claim misinformation while their internal documents show that their PR campaigns are the ones that are misinforming.

The Supreme Court rejected an appeal from J&J to undo $2.1 billion in damages awarded to plaintiffs.

As a result of this, J&J created a new subsidiary, LTL Management LLC, to shield itself from tens of thousands of lawsuits. J&J moved $2 billion in settlement money to this subsidiary, then filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. By doing this they’re holding a limited amount of assets to handle the court cases while protecting the bigger company. LTL’s liabilities are estimated between $1 and $10 billion. This legal maneuver was used widely by asbestos companies facing litigation.

Key Takeaways on Johnson & Johnson’s Asbestos Talc Powder

  • Johnson and Johnson has been held up as one of the most ethical companies due to their handling of the poisoning of Tylenol and how they recalled these in 1982.
  • But even while that event came and passed, J&J was already lying about and covering up that their baby powder, made of talc, was contaminated with asbestos. They’ve known about this, and internally debated it, for at least five decades.
  • Scientific research as early as 1957 showed the contamination of talc by asbestos. Internal research and documentation makes this abundantly clear.
  • Their own scientists advised switching to corn starch, but talc was cheaper and profit was the bottom line.
  • J&J was able to influence the FDA to use a less powerful test that wouldn’t find the asbestos contamination.
  • Their influence extended through philanthropic giving and company executives also sitting on foundation boards.
  • J&J’s public relations shows outright lies. They spread misinformation while stating that the other side is doing so in a classic case of projection.
  • J&J is using bankruptcy protection methods, isolating the liability to a subsidiary setup for such, to make sure this doesn’t do bigger harm to the main company.

Please leave any comments or questions below. Feel free to share it with anyone you’d like.

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The Asbestos Industry

This is Chapter 25 of my new book, working title “The Industry Playbook: Corporate Cartels, Corruption and Crimes Against Humanity” that is being published online chapter by chapter.


If you’re like me, you might recall commercials on TV about mesothelioma and lawsuits you can join. That and the idea that asbestos causes cancer was pretty much the extent of my knowledge about this industry.

You might also think that with the link so clear that asbestos is no longer use. As this chart shows, while it is down from its peak, asbestos production is certainly still strong.

Asbestos is a fibrous mineral that causes cancer, specifically the predominant form linked to it, mesothelioma. Just like tobacco, this is not the only disease linked to asbestos, the other main ones being asbestosis as well as lung cancer.

Barry Castleman, writes in Criminality and Asbestos in Industry, “Dominant companies in the asbestos industry have knowingly and recklessly endangered the health of their workers, their customers, and whole communities in the pursuit of profits since the 1930s. The fact of such business practices being so pervasive, often involving conspiracy in addition to misconduct by individual enterprizes, stands as an indictment of the social order. This documented breadth of misconduct throughout an industry points to a consistent legal, ethical, and corporate failure, not an aberrant one.”

There’s that conspiracy word again! That gives a quick overview, but now let’s dive into the specifics and the playbook strategies you should be familiar with by this point. Note that the time line of the asbestos industry is very close to that of tobacco.  

Asbestos was used in industry because the fibers were strong, durable and resistant to fire, while also being flexible. Asbestos was widely using in buildings, automobiles, shipyards, and other areas, most notably as an insulating material that is heat resistant.

This picture from 1941 shows a nurse laying an asbestos blanket over an electric heater to warm a patient.

By Ministry of Information Photo Division Photographer

The biggest asbestos mining and manufacturing companies included Johns-Manville in the US and Cape Asbestos and Turner & Newall (T&N) in the UK. These companies, known as the “Big Three,” dominated the industry.

Here is a couple of ads from Johns-Manville showing some common places asbestos was used in the home.

Internal Science Kept Under Wraps

As with tobacco, the industrial scientists were the first to know about harms. That they knew all along was revealed through the discovery process brought on by litigation.

There was a 1947 report by W.C.L. Hemeon who was the head engineer of the Industrial Hygiene Foundation of America. This document showed that 20 percent of the workforce at two facilities developed asbestosis. It reported that the current safety standards were insufficient and did not protect workers.

Another case in 1995 led to discovery of internal documentation from Turner & Newell, one of the big three. This internal study found that only 17 or 108 men, and 3 of 18 women, that worked in mines were free of asbestosis. This damning information from 1929 was of course not published.

Johns-Manville company doctors monitored the health of their mine workers. The company doctors told miners their health problems were their own fault because of smoking or other causes, while telling their bosses the true cause. After deaths their lungs were autopsied to be studied. But none of this information was brought to light until court discovery decades later.

In 1948, company executives met to discuss their own science showing asbestos causing cancer in rats. They ordered all reference to cancer and tumors be removed before publishing a report.

The Public Science Builds

Dr. E.R.A. Mereweather published the first epidemiological study of asbestosis in 1930. He found that the average age of workers dying was 41.

“If only the slightest exposure to the dust results ultimately in death, then the scope of the necessary preventive measures is summed up in one word—prohibition—for, practically speaking, it is impossible to prevent such exposure,” he said in 1933.

In 1955, Richard Doll from the Statistical Research Unit, Medical Research Council, in London, showed the first epidemiological evidence of asbestos causing lung cancer among textile workers.

J.C. Wagner’s 1960 study was the first to find an association between mesotheliomas and those living near an asbestos mine in South Africa. This showed the workers weren’t the only ones in danger, but those living close by.  

In the USA, the marking point for the science came in 1964. Dr. Irving Selikoff published research establishing a link between asbestos and disease. Note how this turning point of the science was roughly around the same time as tobacco, as 1964 was when the Surgeon General’s report came out.

The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health stated in 1980 that, “All levels of asbestos exposure studied to date have demonstrated asbestos-related disease…there is no level of exposure below which clinical effects do not occur.”

The Attacks on Dr. Selikoff

Dr. Selikoff was involved in a conference at Mount Sinai Hospital. After this he was contacted by the attorneys of the Asbestos Textile Institute. In 1964 their lawyers threatened that they “urge caution in the discussion of these activities to avoid providing the basis for possibly damaging and misleading news stories. The right to study and to discuss these subjects is clear, of course. But the gravity of the subject matter and the consequences implicitly involved impose upon any who exercise those rights a very high degree of responsibility for their actions.”

A 2007 article in the International Journal of Health Services details the smear campaign that would ramp up. “Selikoff was consistently demonized as a media zealot who exaggerated the risks of asbestos on the back of bogus medical qualifications and flawed science. Since his death, the criticism has become even more vituperative and claims have persisted that he was malicious or a medical fraud. However, most of the attacks on Selikoff were inspired by the asbestos industry or its sympathizers, and for much of his career he was the victim of a sustained and orchestrated campaign to discredit him. The most serious criticisms usually more accurately describe his detractors than Selikoff himself.”

One such attack came from P.W.J. Bartrip titled, “Irving John Selikoff and the strange case of the missing medical degrees.” They accused him of not having a medical degree. He did, though the journal that published the attack refused to publish the degree or retract the article.

Unsurprisingly, internal documentation from the companies included titles such as “Discredit Selikoff.” Selikoff was the main target, but by no means the only one.

The Science Debate Shifts

Recall how the scientific/PR defense of Big Tobacco moved away from saying that smoking didn’t cause disease once that battle was fully lost. They shifted gears to saying tobacco wasn’t addictive, that secondhand smoke wasn’t a problem, that filters worked and more.

And so we see with the asbestos industry a similar shift.

Asbestos is found in six different naturally occurring minerals. These include brown asbestos, blue asbestos and white asbestos.

Once they could no longer hide it, the industry argued that most forms of asbestos were dangerous, but that white asbestos was safe. In the end this turned out to be nothing more than PR spin. And it also was very beneficial to the industry as white asbestos was the vast majority of what was mined.

Paul Cullinan, Professor of Occupational and Environmental Respiratory Disease at the National Heart and Lung Institute, Imperial College London, said, “It’s probably the case that white asbestos is less toxic in respect to mesothelioma than the amphiboles. The industry tries to argue that you can take precautions so that white asbestos can be used safely, but in practice, in the real world, that is not what is going to happen.”

Front Organizations and Institution Infiltration

Groups such as the Asbestos Research Council and the Asbestos Information Committee were formed and used to prop up the PR front.

Dr. Crump worked as a consultant for the Asbestos Information Association. He testified against OSHA regulation in 1984. In the early 2000’s he was contracted by the EPA to develop a mathematical model for risks of asbestos. His model found that white asbestos was not a threat. His model relied on a dose-response analysis done by J.C. McDonald, another industry-funded researcher.

The Institute of Occupational & Environmental Health at McGill University was funded by the Quebec asbestos mining industry. Jock McCulloch, a historian at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology University, wrote, “As the crisis over mesothelioma deepened, the Canadian and South African governments sided uncritically with industry. In 1984, the Asbestos Institute (AI) was formed in Quebec. From its inception, the AI has been dedicated to the ‘safe use of chrysotile asbestos,’ through conferences, public relations initiatives, and the dissemination of scientific information. AI, which describes itself as a ‘non-profit’ organization, has been subsidised by Canadian governments. By 1999 it had received in excess of $40 million in sponsorship.”

Litigation Bankrupts Some but Not All

The first asbestos-related lawsuit in the US was filed in Texas in 1966. As already mentioned, it was the discovery process that led to the revelations about just how much the industry was aware of the problems.  

One unique thing about the story of asbestos, is that this litigation did drive many of the asbestos companies into bankruptcy. Their power was not on the level of Big Tobacco, and thus, for the most part, they weren’t able to stop the turn of tide against them.

Asbestos liabilities led to at least 70 companies going bankrupt since 1976. But that was the smaller producers. The bigger companies were able to survive through underhanded means.

McCulloch wrote, “The tide of litigation that began in the mid 1970s saw the major U.S. producers, including Johns Manville and Raybestos-Manhattan, take refuge in bankruptcy and subsequently re-invent themselves as non-asbestos companies. Simultaneously, the industry shifted offshore to the developing world, where despite the known dangers, more than 2 million tons of chrysotile were used during 2004. The industry’s survival has been due largely to its success in keeping alive the fiction that asbestos can be used safely. Arguably its most potent weapons have been the suppression of evidence about the hazards of asbestos and even the corruption of science to promote doubt about the mineral’s toxicity.”

Here you find the tactic of going worldwide used once again. But also a new tactic of “Beneficial Bankruptcies” that we’ll see play out elsewhere across industries. Bankruptcy can actually be used in certain ways to protect the guilty companies by restructuring assets and striving to use one jurisdiction that is more helpful than another.

“No executive in the United States asbestos mining and manufacturing industry has ever been charged with a crime related to asbestos, despite an impressive record of knowledge and cover-up revealed since the 1970s in civil litigation,” writes Barry Castleman in Criminality and Asbestos in Industry.  

In an article for the Journal of Environmental and Occupational Health Policy Castleman details some attempts to charge those responsible in the USA. But the judges in these cases appeared to be on the side of the industry executives that were charged with willful and wanton endangerment.

The Strange Case of Schmidheiny

But I will detail a fascinating case from Italy described that sought to hold an owner responsible. Stephan Schmidheiny inherited Eternit, an asbestos-cement company with many mines and factories. Criminal charges were brought against Schmidheiny that resulted in a court case ending in 2011. Castleman writes, “In its eight hundred-page explanation of its verdict (‘‘Motivation’’), the appeal court found that Schmidheiny had directed a cover-up that delayed the ban of asbestos in Italy by ten years. The court concluded that Schmidheiny personally ordered a campaign of disinformation from 1976 on, in order to protect his fortune.”

“In reinventing himself as a ‘‘green’’ businessman in the 1990s, Stephan Schmidheiny created the World Business Council for Sustainable Development and began donating money to South American Conservation groups. He wrote several books saying business needed to conserve energy and manage resources sustainably, which was not yet a standard theme of corporate image advertizing. He was among the business leaders attending the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. There, the billionaire was able to find help in his rebranding effort.”

We’ll see more examples of this greenwashing elsewhere.

Further appeal to the Italian Supreme Court had this overturned in 2014, saying his was guilty but that the statute of limitations had passed.

The prosecutors didn’t give up. In May 2019, Schmidheiny was once again sentenced to jail for four years over the deaths of two workers that had no statute of limitations. This is being appealed and is the last update I could find.

EPA and OSHA Formed to Fight Asbestos

The EPA, the Environmental Protection Agency, was formed in 1970. OSHA, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, was formed in 1971.

These were formed in part due to asbestos and the need to regulate it. The Clean Air Act of 1970 classified asbestos as an air pollutant. It gave the EPA the power to regulate use and disposal of asbestos. The Toxic Substances Control Act, in 1976, gave the EPA authority to place restrictions on certain chemicals including asbestos.

In 1986, the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act had the EPA establish guidelines for removal of asbestos from schools.

In 1989, the EPA issued the Asbestos Ban and Phase-Out Rule. This aimed to fully ban the manufacturing, importing and sale of asbestos-containing products. However, the industry fought back. After appeal, Corrosion Proof Fittings v. Environmental Protection Agency, overturned the ban in 1991.

The Asbestos Information Association (AIA) was formed by the industry. The director was Matthew Swetonic, who explained what they were able to accomplish in fighting against these regulations. “I think it is a gauge of the effectiveness of the total industry involvement in this most crucial matter that of eleven main requirements in the [OSHA] standards, the industry position was accepted totally by OSHA on nine of the eleven, about fifty percent on a tenth, and totally rejected on only one. The struggle is far from over. We must not only continue but indeed expand our activities and the various areas of concern.”

More attempts were introduced to complete ban asbestos. Such as the Ban Asbestos in American Act in 2002. In 2007, this bill passed the Senate but not the House.

The United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and all of the European Union, at least 50 countries in total, have all banned asbestos use. The United States has not.

Use has gone way down, but it is still used in certain applications. In 2018, 750 metric tons were imported into the US. An estimated 10,000 people per year die in the United States from asbestos related disease.

A report from the WHO in 2018 found that about 125 million people in the world were exposed to asbestos in the workplace. And a whopping half of all deaths from occupational cancer come about because of asbestos.

Hill & Knowlton Strikes Again

Would it surprise you at all to learn that the asbestos industry worked with the PR Firm, Hill & Knowlton (H&K) the principle party behind Big Tobacco’s initiative to control the scientific debate?

In 1968, T&N had a five-point plan from H&K that stated in capital letters, “NEVER BE THE FIRST TO RAISE THE HEALTH QUESTION.” The points including emphasizing rarity and stressing the safety controls were effective.

Another front organization (are you keeping track of all these?) the Asbestos Information Centre shared offices with H&K. Again, just like the TIRC did.

In the early 1980’s U.S. Gypsum Company hired H&K to help with public schools seeking compensation for removal of asbestos. More companies joined with the firm, forming an industry coalition to face the threat together.

H&K’s strategy involved forming a “third-party panel of independent experts to be available for testimony, commentary and technical support in appropriate markets and forums.”

They also said, “the spread of media coverage must be stopped at the local level and as soon as possible.”

It was yet another Scientific Advisory Board. While the experts would be “independent” the funding would come from the industry itself.

In 1984, H&K formed the Safe Buildings Alliance (SBA) which could “could also act to deflect attention away from affected companies” and “take the heat from activist industry critics.” A court later found that “Due to the financial and operational control that the [asbestos manufacturers] exercise over the SBA, the SBA is merely the alter ego of the [asbestos manufacturers].”

Sounds quite similar to the National Smokers’ Alliance or Center for Indoor Air Research, run by Big Tobacco’s PR firms to me.

Big Names and Politicians On Your Side

A memo between two asbestos plant managers were noted as saying, “In tackling a problem of this nature [mesothelioma] one should either be completely frank with everyone or maintain complete secrecy – it is the latter that [Professor Archie Cochrane, director of epidemiology at the Medical Research Council] feels is best at the moment.”

A leader of public health and science was telling them to keep silent on the dangers. This was the man by which the Cochrane Collaboration was named. He is considered one of the fathers of clinical epidemiology and evidence-based medicine.

If he could be swayed to take the industry’s side, is any science safe at all?

In the UK, member of Parliament Cyril Smith, was also shareholder in one of the big three, T&N. Regarding regulation by the government, he had at least one speech he delivered in the House, drafted by T&N.

And it turns out Smith was also a serial child sexual abuser which came to light much later. If you’re willing to abuse children, taking money from an industry and lying about it is not nearly as bad, right? Why wouldn’t you do that if you’re committing much greater crimes? After all it would help you to accumulate money and power which would be useful in being able to abuse more, while getting away with it.

We’ll unfortunately see examples of pedophile politicians come up again.

Conclusion

Of course, there are far more details available. I’ve tried to cover in a single chapter what it took me twenty chapters to do with Big Tobacco. And this pattern will mostly continue. It was a brief overview, showing just a few of the specifics involved in a century long industry.

The big picture I hope you can see is that it was almost exactly the same playbook in use, including one of the exact same players involved, Hill & Knowlton.

In the next chapter we look at the problems of asbestos in one of the world’s most famous products and the lies and coverup involved.

Key Takeaways on The Asbestos Industry

  • Internal science from as early as the 1920’s was showing that asbestos was dangerous. The industry covered this up.
  • As public science came out showing the dangers, the industry went on the defensive smearing and attacking such scientists.
  • The industry hired PR Firms, including Hill & Knowlton to basically run the exact same PR strategy as Big Tobacco did.
  • The EPA and OSHA were both created in part to offer protection against asbestos. Their powers were influenced by the industry even from early on. Front organizations were successful in stalling the scientific truth and keeping regulations, such as those from OSHA, at bay.
  • Litigation bankrupted some of the smaller companies, but many of the bigger one’s continued to thrive by utilizing bankruptcy loopholes or going more worldwide. No executive was held liable except possibly one in Italy where ongoing court cases are still occurring from events that occurred in the 80’s.
  • Despite the near unanimous recognition of asbestos dangers at any level, it is still produced in many countries and only banned in some.

Please leave any comments or questions below. Feel free to share it with anyone you’d like.

Links to all published chapters of The Industry Playbook can be found here.

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Culture Shift (The Industry Playbook)

This is Chapter 24 of my new book, working title “The Industry Playbook: Corporate Cartels, Corruption and Crimes Against Humanity” that is being published online chapter by chapter.


What ultimately led to Big Tobacco losing some power? The legal battles were important. The overwhelming scientific facts eventually became self-evident. The whistleblowers definitely helped. The solid journalism that covered all of the above was critical. And it was all these things that coalesced into shifting culture.

For a moment stop thinking of yourself as an individual, but awash in a sea of humanity. So many of your thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and values come about because of the culture we’re surrounded with. Yes, you can consciously change these things, but most things are formed or at the very least influenced from the culture you live in.

In this chapter I will re-examine many of the events that previously were covered. However, this is done through the lens of how it shifted the overall culture. 

Brandt writes, “In 1926, Chesterfield, then the nation’s number one cigarette, ran its famous advertisement in which a woman asks a man smoking nearby to ‘Blow Some My Way.’ From the perspective of the late twentieth century, this ad is a strikingly ironic indication of the radical shift in the nature of smoking and risk.”

Reflect on that for a moment. This successful ad campaign came before there was even a shred of an idea that secondhand smoke was dangerous. It speaks to outdated male and female roles that have similarly changed in our culture.

Recall in 1929 that chief propagandist Edward Bernays launched the “torches of freedom” campaign in order to get women to smoke in public. This campaign allied itself with a cultural movement (women’s liberation) that was already strongly in force. You could say it was co-opted by Bernays and Big Tobacco in order to sell more cigarettes. And remember, this was a successful PR campaign. It was no longer “blow some my way” but women smoke for yourselves.

What steers culture? Advertising does to a degree. Public relations far more so. And the professional relations (doctors, scientists, journalists, politicians, etc.) is the more critical part of that happening. This is true in Big Tobacco steering the culture where they want it, for reasons of profit. But it is equally true of public health advocates, anti-smokers, etc. that wanted to steer the culture the opposite way.

Culture is by and large steered through the media. In 1952, a popular article, “Cancer by the Carton” was republished in Reader’s Digest gaining wide circulation. The next year Time magazine published an article about titled, “Beyond Any Doubt.” These were some of the earlier pieces in major media publications that began the shift in the view of tobacco.

Yet, this was matched a short time later by Big Tobacco’s “A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers.” It wasn’t in a single major media publication but instead went out in 448 newspapers across 258 cities. This in turn won more media promotion from journalists congratulating Big Tobacco on doing the right thing in researching the risks of tobacco.

Now we had a cultural war on our hands. The scientific evidence coming to light about the risks of tobacco which would naturally work to lower consumption. And the warring side was Big Tobacco defending against this, seeking to promote cigarettes even more.

Television coverage is a place where culture is steered by and large especially back then due to the limit of media choices. At CBS Edward Murrow covered the tobacco controversy in two consecutive broadcasts at CBS. The head of Hill & Knowlton worked hard to make sure the coverage was a “balanced one” thus bringing the culture war over tobacco to the forefront. This controversy would continue for another decade at least. Some of the culture believed the science about the risks. Others in the culture believed Big Tobacco’s stance that the risks weren’t proven.

In 1961, 488 billion cigarettes were sold. Per capita consumption was 4,025 cigarettes. “From a business standpoint the tobacco industry has weathered this latest spate of health attacks on its products,” celebrated Hill &Knowlton. In other words, they were successfully “managing” the culture. 

In 1967, John Banzhaf, a lawyer, asked the FCC to apply the “fairness doctrine” to cigarette advertising. The FCC granted a mandate of one antismoking message for every three TV commercials. These ads proved to lower cigarette consumption. This impact on culture led Big Tobacco to stop advertising on TV completely. While they continued to advertise elsewhere, this was a major big blow to their influence.

Imagine if this had not happened. There’s a good chance, with continued TV advertising they would have had more influence on journalism then they did. (Just look at Big Pharma’s every-other-commercial advertising onslaught in the USA on major news programs today.) 

In 1978, Roper Organization, working under the direction of the Tobacco Institute, conducted a survey reporting, “Nearly six out of ten believe the smoking is hazardous to the non-smoker’s health, up sharply over the last four years. More than two-thirds of non-smokers believe it and nearly one-half of all smokers believe it. This we see as the most dangerous development to the viability of the tobacco industry that has yet occurred.” In other words, the cultural tide was turning.

“Many observers in the media and among tobacco interests predicted a war between smokers and nonsmokers, but it never happened,” writes Brandt. “As public restrictions on smoking became more aggressive in the 1980s and early 1990s, compliance remained remarkably high despite little or no official enforcement…The thousands of smoking regulations enacted during this period were only a step ahead of changing social conventions, and they did not cause conflict so much as help legitimate the new norms…What was fragrant became foul; what was attractive became repulsive; a public behavior became virtually private.”

If the culture, meaning the public at large, wasn’t ready for such laws there would have been more pushback on them. But the public was ready. The culture was ahead of the laws being enacted because of science and media.

You can see this even more clearly on flights. In 1988, smoking was banned on flights of two hours or less. Northwest Airlines announced a total ban on smoking which they heavily advertised and were successful with. More and more people, the culture at large, wanted smokeless flights. Culture is going to affect business decisions such as this. This wouldn’t have happened in the 50’s or 60’s. An airline that advertised smokeless flights back then almost assuredly would have flopped. In 1990, smoking was banned on all domestic flights.

A big cultural marker was in April 1994 when the CEO’s of the top seven tobacco companies appeared before Congress and all stated under oath that tobacco was not addictive nor that they manipulated nicotine levels in cigarettes.

By this point and time, most of American culture saw through the deceit of Big Tobacco. In fact, within the following year every one of those CEO’s had been replaced. I guess lying to Congress was not seen as good leadership, or at least good PR.

The cultural tide turning led to even more revelations coming out. The 90’s were largely the decade of the tobacco whistleblower. This led to big media coverage despite all of Big Tobacco’s efforts to keep whistleblowers under wraps. In included the leaked documents from Merrell Williams, the revelations of Jeffrey Wigand and others.

Entertainment, as a subset of media, is a big part of culture. So when Wigand’s story got promoted further through 1999’s The Insider starring Al Pacino and Russell Crowe it further shaped culture. This movie was nominated for seven academy awards. It received lots of attention.

I remember watching this movie when I was a teenager. Without fully grasping the context, and having nowhere near the understanding I currently possess, this movie still imprinted some of these basics on me. If I hadn’t seen this movie then, would I still be writing this book? Maybe or maybe not, it’s impossible to say for sure. Yet that I even can pose that question shows the influence of cultural impacts.

Brandt writes, “As the social and political status of the industry deteriorated, a number of institutions took actions to reduce the influence of the companies. Some universities, pension funds, and state governments divested their holdings in tobacco stocks. And a number of universities developed new policies to ban the acceptance of tobacco research funding—acknowledgement that the industry had historically used such grants to gain status and legitimacy, while distorting scientific progress.”

These are only steps that could happen when enough of the culture is aware of and believes in the goodness of such actions. And yet there is also individual action. Who started up the conversation at the first university to do so? Who took the steps that would lead the culture moving forward in that direction?

Now, you might think that Big Tobacco losing a RICO case in 2006 would be the final nail in the coffin of them having any cultural influence, but alas that is not the case. It is in the industry’s best interest for all these lessons to be forgotten. We saw how they target the youth of today in much the same way as previously. However, without the cultural influence that I and many others grew up in, such lessons are lost on many.

Of course, it’s not just the tobacco industry alone that wants this stuff forgotten. The PR firms, lawyers, politicians and others that benefit from the use of the Industry Playbook strategies don’t want the culture at large to know them.

Education is important to keep these lessons top of mind for every person. That’s why I wrote this, in the hopes that it can steer the culture, even just slightly, in a positive way.

Key Takeaways on Culture Shift

  • Culture both influences and is influenced by everything that occurs especially popular media whether that is news coverage or entertainment, as these are the main ways most people interact with scientific, legal, political or other fronts.
  • Culture can be steered in ways that are both for good and ill.
  • The co-opting of a cultural movement already under way, as we saw with Bernays’ “Torches of Freedom” campaign allying itself to women’s liberation, can be a PR masterstroke. Attaching yourself to a cultural movement in action is easier than starting one from scratch.
  • What effectively steers the culture, such as a successful advertising or PR campaign, must be matched to the times. Any other time it could flop. The culture is the environment in which all things take place.
  • For laws to take effect it often must mean that the culture is ahead of the legislation being passed and enacted.
  • Culture effects business decisions such as making smokeless flights available, institutions divesting of tobacco stocks and more. These can be seen as both cultural movements on a collective level, as well as the individual decisions and actions involved.

Please leave any comments or questions below. Feel free to share it with anyone you’d like.

Links to all published chapters of The Industry Playbook can be found here.

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Real Grassroots Organization (The Industry Playbook)

This is Chapter 23 of my new book, working title “The Industry Playbook: Corporate Cartels, Corruption and Crimes Against Humanity” that is being published online chapter by chapter.


Earlier we covered astroturf, that is fake grassroots. The influence of this PR strategy is that there is genuine power behind grassroots organizations. This is where there are real people that are passionate about something. In many cases they try and succeed in changing legislation or make other impact

In 1966, Betty Carnes, whose son had died from lung cancer, started Arizonans Concerned About Smoking, one of the first nonsmokers’ rights groups. They sent out thousands of “Thank you for not smoking” signs. They lobbied their state legislatures.

Ultimately, they were successful. In 1973, due to their campaigning, Arizona became the first state within the USA to pass a law restricting smoking in public places.

In 1970, Clara Gouin started up a group in Maryland, Group Against Smoking Pollution (GASP). They started small, removing ashtrays from their homes. Against the threat of being seen as bad hostesses, they made this action with the support of each other. Within a year they had sent out 500 chapter kits to groups around the country, the movement growing organically.

A former Minnesota state senator, Edward Brandt, founded a local chapter of the Association for Non-Smokers’ Rights in 1973. Through similar lobbying and grassroots campaigning, Minnesota passed the Clean Indoor Air Act in 1975, which banned smoking in most public places.

It is critical to understand that these grassroots groups focused on smaller, more local governments. They helped San Francisco pass restrictions on public smoking in 1983. Big Tobacco’s powerful reach was less effective within cities, counties and sometimes states, than it was at the federal level.

In 1974, Tobacco Institute president Horace Kornegay stated that the “relative calm in Washington” disguised “stormy weather out in the states.” Over time, 41 states and 1,354 cities would enact smoking laws, while the federal government never did.

Sadly, it was after a few initial real grassroots wins that Big Tobacco got more serious about using astroturf organizations and mounting solid defenses against such local organization. California tried to follow suit with these other states, with Proposition 5, but Big Tobacco was able to defeat this in 1978 by spending $6.5 million.

The American Legacy Foundation, which later was renamed the Truth Initiative, ran a campaign around the idea of “What if cigarette ads told the Truth?” Here is a two page spread from a magazine. 

Unfortunately, it is much harder to find information about all these smaller groups. There is no one centralized organization to match CTR or the Tobacco Institute. Instead, it is the results of hundreds of smaller organizations and non-profits.

These many actions led to legislation, but also were important in helping to shift the culture, as is covered in the next chapter.

Key Takeaways on Real Grassroots Organization

  • It is easier for corporations such as Big Tobacco to influence politics at the federal level. It is harder to influence politics at a state and local level. Therefore, grassroots organization at the smaller levels was ultimately more successful.
  • Public smoking bans started with single cities and states, and within a couple of decades, some forms of restriction were in place in most areas.
  • No one group was able to match the power of Big Tobacco. But real people fighting for real change could cause real world effects to happen.

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Discovery and Litigation (The Industry Playbook)

This is Chapter 22 of my new book, working title “The Industry Playbook: Corporate Cartels, Corruption and Crimes Against Humanity” that is being published online chapter by chapter.


An earlier chapter covered the army of lawyers used by Big Tobacco in mounting a solid legal defense against any threat. And this defense was very successful.

But lawyers aren’t all bad. There are also lawyers on the other side who were fighting for the truth to come out. “For all the significant political objections to judicial activism and the public disparagement of trial lawyers, it seems important to recognize that the legal process serves certain social ends that the legislative process is poorly structured to address,” writes Brandt. “The courts possess a highly articulated set of procedures for the production and evaluation of evidence on behalf of the public adjudication of responsibility for harms. Demonstrating these harms, within institutional structure that are relatively insulated from the pressures of political and economic interests, serves a critical social good. It is because they brought such facts into public view that the courts have offered such a crucial civic arena for pursuing the control of tobacco.”

We previously saw how legal counsel came to dominate overall strategy for Big Tobacco. However, it was also through the legal process that discovery happens, that is what the tobacco companies knew and when they knew it that could be revealed. Ultimately, it was in the courts the key cases were eventually won.

Understand that this was how the science was really settled, in that we’d see Big Tobacco talking internally about the risks and dangers of their product, separate from their PR campaigns.

Big Tobacco was able to defy regulation due to their influence. Thus, “Tort law became a tool for indirect regulatory policy,” states Brandt. “Between 1994 and 1997, more lawsuits were filed against tobacco firms than in the previous thirty years.”

In one case the judge Kenneth J. Fitzpatrick ruled that Philip Morris had engaged “in an egregious attempt to hide information.” There was proof that they destroyed documents. Here he found that the lawyers had explicitly reviewed industry materials, such as scientific studies, for the purpose of claiming privilege.

Special Master Mark W. Gehan reviewed privileged documents of Big Tobacco in the 90’s. He found that the attorney-client privilege had been abused. Brandt writes, “His ruling implicated the attorneys as not ‘representing’ the legal interests of their clients but as full-fledged participants in a decades-long conspiracy.”

Attorney Mike Ciresi had argued “that counsel for the tobacco industry advised the industry to conceal documents and research harmful to the industry by depositing documents with counsel, by routing correspondence through the industry counsel, by naming damning research projects as ‘special projects’ purportedly ordered by counsel, etc., to cover potentially dangerous materials under a blanket of attorney-client privilege protection, and Plaintiffs wish to tear this blanket away.”

The legal process was necessary to showcase Big Tobacco’s lawyers as conspirators.  Again, it was discovery of internal documentation that proved this publicly.

One court case builds upon the next. With discovery out in the open and rulings in place, the next court case could often be a little more successful.

Such was the case for the Cipollone case. The lawyer for the plaintiff, Marc Edell, had amassed 300,000 internal tobacco documents. Although Edell won the case, he never received damages for his clients.

This case was appealed up to the Supreme Court, but they refused to hear it. Accordingly, these industry documents were made public. Attorney Richard Daynard said these documents would “provide a firm foundation for future plaintiffs to build a convincing case of fraud and conspiracy against the tobacco industry.”

In the last chapter we covered the paralegal who became a whistleblower, Merrell Williams and his leaking of what became known as the ‘Cigarette Papers’.  While a huge milestone that was just one piece of the action.

Through discovery, there are now over 40,000,000 pages of tobacco documents available online.

The proof is all available there. But it is a massive amount! (Burying the opponents in useless paperwork being another tactic of a strong legal defense. You must disclose some things but sometimes you can hide it, in volume, especially if your opponent is short-staffed.)

The legal process, especially through the component of discovery, is key to unveiling conspiracies. We’ll see this time and time again in industry after industry.

Key Takeaways on Discovery and Litigation

  • The judicial system, specifically tort law, was a critical area where the truth of Big Tobacco came to light through the discovery process.
  • While Big Tobacco was successful in any and all civil lawsuits for many years, the tide eventually turned against them.
  • Each successful discovery of proof of Big Tobacco’s deceit, each successful court case, was a stepping stone for the next. The internal documentation revealed in one case could be used to build the following one.
  • It was shown in court cases that the lawyers for Big Tobacco were not only representing their clients, but part of the conspiracy in covering up criminal activity, abusing the attorney-client privilege.

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Whistleblowers and Media Coverage (The Industry Playbook)

This is Chapter 21 of my new book, working title “The Industry Playbook: Corporate Cartels, Corruption and Crimes Against Humanity” that is being published online chapter by chapter.


If it weren’t for whistleblowers, we may never had learned the truth about Big Tobacco. Legally, a whistleblower is an insider of a business or political body that reveals crime. In the popular culture, it has come to mean any insider that shows wrongdoing whether illegal or just immoral. Big Tobacco had many whistleblowers over the years.

James Mold was a research scientist at Liggett. He had worked on the XA cigarette which was designed to be safer. As one of the first whistleblowers to come out, a deposition showed him testifying that Liggett had suppressed this safer cigarette even though it worked. Why? To roll out a safer cigarette would be to acknowledge the truth about the lack of safety of their other products.

Because of the size of the companies that make up Big Tobacco it is not like any one whistleblower can reveal the whole truth. Instead, each one may just reveal certain documents, one piece of the puzzle.

In February 1994, ABC’s Day One news program featured an anonymous whistle blower nicknamed “Deep Cough” from R.J. Reynolds. He revealed that tobacco companies knowingly added more nicotine to cigarettes to increase addictiveness. 

It was this that got the attention of the FDA and Congress. During this program, former Surgeon General Everett Koop said, “I would think that if I were the administrator of FDA and I learned that nicotine was being added to cigarettes to increase the amount of nicotine present that I would view that cigarette as a delivery device for the use of nicotine which is, under ordinary circumstances, a prescription drug. And I would think that demanded regulation.”

Merrell Williams was a paralegal at Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs who had been working for Brown & Williamson from 1988 to 1992 when he was laid off. He went through quintuple bypass surgery, likely a result of being a lifelong smoker. He would go on to become a whistleblower revealing a treasure trove of documents, more than 4,000 pages containing damning materials, from Brown & Williamson. And this was not easy to do.

Brandt writes, “Williams and [his attorney] Scruggs had each pushed the margins of law and ethics in their efforts to get the [documents] into the public domain…They had conspired to break a remarkable conspiracy…In retrospect, the documents might very well have remained locked within the fortress of Big Tobacco; so much of what we have come to know about the history of the tobacco industry might have remained cloaked by attorney-client privilege.”

In 1994, The New York Times published “Tobacco Company Was Silent on Hazards” which featured some of the leaked documents from Merrell Williams. This news piece said, “the executives of the…Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation chose to remain silent, to keep their research results secret, to stop work on a safer cigarette and to pursue a legal and public relations strategy of admitting nothing.”

The Cigarette Papers, as they came to be called where placed online in June 1995 by University of California in San Francisco. These can still be found online along with many other industry documents.

As a result of this, the following month, a series of five peer-reviewed articles appear in JAMA detailing what Big Tobacco knew and did. The whistleblower leaks helped to bolster scientific fact.

Brown & Williamson senior research scientist Jeffrey Wigand became a principal informant to the FDA. He shared nicotine delivery was enhanced with the use of ammonia-based compounds. He shared how different tobacco plants were blended together to ensure high enough nicotine content. He even shared how genetic engineering was being used to increase nicotine levels.

In August 1995, Wigand was interviewed by Mike Wallace for CBS’ 60 Minutes. Unfortunately, Big Tobacco was able to put tremendous pressure on CBS not to air this. In October, CBS decided to cancel the 60 Minutes broadcast featuring Wigand. Daniel Schoor of CBS said, “The tobacco industry…has apparently settled on the threat of lawsuit as a key weapon in its defense against an increasingly unfavorable press. “

But more leaking helped this to get this story out. In 1996, CBS’ Wigand interview got leaked to the New York Daily News and Wall Street Journal which published parts of the transcript. With the threat of legal action reduced 60 Minutes issues a revised version of its original story. You can watch that here.

This story is beautifully told by the movie, The Insider.  This features Jeffrey Wigand, played by Russell Crowe and 60 Minutes producer Lowell Bergman, played by Al Pacino. This story not only covers the threats and smearing that comes with being a whistleblower, but a look at the threats that come with daring to cover the truth in a news program. 

This story fairly accurately portrays just how close Big Tobacco came to stopping the revelations of Wigand through their multi-pronged attack.

There were plenty of others. Some Philip Morris scientist whistleblowers included William Farone, Victor DeNoble, and Paul Mele.

While most of the whistleblowers were scientists, we do see others involved, such as the paralegal Williams. We can even see a CEO step into this role.

Bennett LeBow, CEO of the Liggett Group, was a leverage buyout entrepreneur. In other words, he didn’t rise up withing Big Tobacco like other executives did. He took a different track than the rest of Big Tobacco, including settling cases with the states while other tobacco companies fought against them.

LeBow signed an agreement for immunity in exchange for turning over Liggett and other company documents. He even publicly admitted tobacco caused cancer and that companies had knowingly marketed to children. It is telling to contrast this position to that of every other tobacco CEO.

We can see that whistleblowers were many of the key positions in the fight against Big Tobacco regarding science, but even more so in the courts and the courts of public opinion, mediated primarily through journalists.

We know about these examples because Big Tobacco wasn’t able to stop them. Unfortunately, there is a chilling thought about all this. How many would-be whistleblowers that were successfully stopped by Big Tobacco’s reach when they saw what Wigand and others went through?

Key Takeaways on Whistleblowers and the Media

  • Several whistleblowers were the ones to reveal the science that Big Tobacco kept under lock and key, including how they added nicotine to cigarettes, had made a safer cigarette and more.
  • Getting internal documents into the public domain was key to having the mass media give them coverage further getting the information out to the public.
  • Even a CEO could act as a whistleblower, working in opposition to the rest of Big Tobacco.
  • Big Tobacco would pull out every stop to dissuade and silence whistleblowers and stop them from being able to get favorable coverage in the news. While they were unsuccessful with those detailed in this chapter, there may be many more we don’t know about where they were successful for one reason or another.

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Introduction to Breaking Free (The Industry Playbook)

This is Chapter 20 of my new book, working title “The Industry Playbook: Corporate Cartels, Corruption and Crimes Against Humanity” that is being published online chapter by chapter.

This is the beginning of Part 2 – Breaking Free of Big Tobacco.


In the previous part, we detailed the many strategies from the Tobacco Playbook. I contend that overall Big Tobacco did win the overall war. After all, they’re still around and still very profitable. But without a doubt, they did lose some key battles especially within the USA. How did this occur? In this section I detail out four specific areas.

Let me state that the war cannot be won by science alone. While that piece is important and was largely the reason for the war in the first place, that’s just a starting point.

Beyond science, it is through the methods described herein that the dangers became publicly known and widely accepted.

  • Whistleblowers and Media Coverage
  • Discovery & Litigation
  • Real Grassroots Organization
  • Culture Shift

The foregoing chapters explain what we the people were up against when it came to Big Tobacco. It explains the many strategies and tactics inside of the Industry Playbook that are used to promote and protect profits, even at the cost of human lives.

Awareness of these tactics is useful for you personally. Collectively, understanding what led to that success is critical. Again, it is not just so that we understand what happened in Big Tobacco, but we can collectively aim at the same things against those that commit crimes against humanity today while utilizing the Industry Playbook all the same.

This is broken up over four sections.

Whistleblowers are instrumental. These are the insider’s that leak documentation or share what is really going on. Generally, without whistleblowers, there is no breaking free. Because of the power of insiders, you must understand the smear campaigns and worse that comes from Big Tobacco against them. This includes not just whistleblowers but how it effectively stops would-be whistleblowers. We’ll see the role that whistleblowers play, particular with their interfacing with the media.

While the justice system is not without its flaws and corruption, it may be the least economically influenced of the three branches of government in the USA! The legal process allows for discovery and litigation in a process that was essential for these truths coming to light. The courts are where so many battles were fought. While Big Tobacco had total victory for a long time, this eventually did shift. With each shift cracks in their defenses grew and grew. As you’ll see, it was the discovery of internal documents that proved Big Tobacco’s crimes for the world to see.

We’ve seen how Big Tobacco captured politics to work in its favor. However, especially on a real grassroots and local level, the battles were easier to fight by the people, instituting change on this smaller but still immensely useful level.

Ultimately, it was the science, the whistleblowers, and the court cases predominately that led to a cultural shift. This is the most important step, yet in many ways the most difficult one to achieve. The fact is that people could withdraw their funding from any company, and it would collapse quickly. But getting to that mass action is not easy, so how a culture shifts is analyzed here.

These factors as well as additional smaller ones are explored in the following chapters. These lessons from history with Big Tobacco act as our starter ground for diving in even deeper in Part 7 – The People’s Playbook with other industries and more contemporary examples.

Key Takeaways on Introduction to Breaking Free

  • Correct and accurate science is insufficient to overcome the power of industry. While it is crucial, it is not enough without other levers to get it out in the open.
  • Whistleblowers are the key part of revelation as these insider’s come from the industry itself to show wrongdoing. Thus, bringing to light their information can be enough to turn the tide of war. And for this reason, industry uses many strategies to overcome any would-be whistleblower.
  • The discovery process in litigation is crucial for showing the lies of industry. While their PR spin says one thing, internal documentation can show what they knew when.
  • The political power of industry can be immense able to capture the highest levels. Ironically, it is the local level of politics that becomes that much more difficult to sway showing the real grassroots organization can be successful.
  • Ultimately, this is a culture war. Every strategy and tactic can shift the dominant viewpoint of the culture which can best be seen by zooming out over the arc of history.

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Diversification (The Industry Playbook)

This is Chapter 19 of my new book, working title “The Industry Playbook: Corporate Cartels, Corruption and Crimes Against Humanity” that is being published online chapter by chapter.


This subject was first hinted at in an earlier chapter. After ABC’s Day One program featured a whistleblower in February of 1994, Philip Morris sued for libel. They also threatened to pull advertising. Had they just been in the cigarette business at the time, they wouldn’t have been able to do this as cigarettes were no longer advertised on TV. Yet Philip Morris had this power because they had diversified beyond cigarettes. They owned other brands such as Kraft Foods and Miller Beer, whose advertising budget was over $100 million per year.

By consolidating power, in buying up other products, they could wield more influence than had the giant corporation stuck just to cigarettes. This diversification was useful across product lines because it gave them additional leverage. Here we see just one example of how that assisted them.

Philip Morris changed their name to the Altria Group in 2003 as part of their public relations. Their spin was that this was because they had moved beyond cigarettes into a consumer-packaged goods company. But primarily it was a deflection of the bad PR they were getting. Recall that name changes are common for PR efforts.

Nowadays, Altria is “Moving Beyond Smoking™”. They’re still primarily in the tobacco business, not just cigarettes, but chew, cigars, pipes, nicotine pouches, and vape products. They hold a 10% stake in Anheuser-Busch, the world’s largest brewer.

But they’re elsewhere too that you wouldn’t necessarily expect them to be. Philip Morris Capital Corporation “is an investment company that manages a portfolio of leased assets including domestic and international aircraft, power plants and real estate.”   

The following is the strangest case of diversification I’ve come across. Both flu and Covid-19 vaccines are being developed by British American Tobacco (BAT), through their US based subsidiary Kentucky BioProcessing (KBP).

BAT was the one that wouldn’t dare mention the word cancer internally, so they used the code word ZEPHYR. BAT denied science behind cancer, nicotine’s addiction and secondhand smoke. BAT was caught red-handed destroying damaging documents. BAT was found guilty in the RICO case. But they’re still going strong.

PR allows for great whitewashing. Or perhaps the term greenwashing is more at play here. It appears that BAT, as part of the ESG targets (Environmental, Social, and Governance) plans to be using 100% renewable energy by 2030 and carbon neutral across their entire value chain by 2050.

In fact, in 2020, BAT was nominated as one of the top three ESG-rated companies in the top 100 largest publicly traded companies in the United Kingdom. In other words, they’re currently winning awards for their commitment to the environment and people.

What better way to do this then to jump into healthcare? “KBP has been exploring alternative uses of the tobacco plant for some time. One such alternative use is the development of plant-based vaccines,” says Dr. David O’Reilly, the director of scientific research at BAT.

It’s a plant-based vaccine so it must be better for you, right? Would you like a plant-based vaccine to go with your plant-based diet? That’s some marketing language for you there.

The facts are that this is nothing native to tobacco. But instead, scientists inserted viral genes into the tobacco plant to grow antigens and extract them out.

This genetic engineering of tobacco plants isn’t all that new. Research conducted by Brown & Williamson decades earlier had sought to use genetic engineering to double the levels of nicotine in the plants.

“Moving into human trials with both our Covid-19 and seasonal flu vaccine candidates is a significant milestone and reflects our considerable efforts to accelerate the development of our emerging biologicals portfolio,” said O’Reilly.

U.S health regulators have given them the greenlight. Phase 3 clinical trials are currently in progress at the time of writing.

Based on our “warp speed” timelines these could hit the market early 2022. Do you trust Big Tobacco is 100% above the board when it comes to their vaccines?

Nor is this the only Big Tobacco move into healthcare. Philip Morris International recently bought several biotech companies, including products that treat heart attacks and respiratory conditions. “Philip Morris’s attempted takeover of a key player in lung health products beggars belief,” said Jonathan Ashworth, Labour’s shadow health secretary.  

Sadly, it only sounds extraordinary if you’re not familiar with the industry playbook. For a company, why not profit on both the cause and effects of their products? It won’t be the only time we see it happening.

Key Takeaways on Leverage

  • Owning food brands gave the tobacco companies leverage to threaten to pull advertising on television programs.
  • Companies such as Philip Morris, named Altria now, are still in the tobacco business but also in alcoholic beverages, aircrafts, power plants, real estate and more.
  • Big Tobacco companies are diversifying into a wide range of other businesses, including:
    • COVID-19 and flu vaccines that involve the genetic engineering of tobacco plants to produce plant-based vaccines
    • Healthcare that involves treating some of the diseases that tobacco causes
  • BAT is currently winning awards and acclaim for their commitment to ESG targets such as renewable energy and carbon reduction.

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Up to Old and New Tricks (The Industry Playbook)

This is Chapter 18 of my new book, working title “The Industry Playbook: Corporate Cartels, Corruption and Crimes Against Humanity” that is being published online chapter by chapter.


The majority of this book has covered events in the 20th century extending a bit into the 21st with occasional exceptions. You might want to believe that based on losing the RICO case, finally getting under FDA regulation, the culture wars that ensued, and more that Big Tobacco reformed their ways. If that is the case, you would be mistaken. What you’ll see here is that the playbook is still working fine.

In recent years, vaping has become popular. Kids today are getting hooked on it. Very likely the history of Big Tobacco is being completely lost on them.

An article at The Bureau of Investigative Journalism by Matthew Chapman reported in 2021, “BAT [British American Tobacco] has told regulators around the world that its new products, including heated tobacco and oral nicotine, are for current adult smokers. But…it has launched an aggressive £1bn marketing campaign that leans heavily on social media, concerts and sporting events, which could have the effect of encouraging young people to pick up a potentially deadly tobacco habit that still kills 8 million people a year, notwithstanding long-established rules aimed at preventing this.”

BAT said, “All marketing activity for our products will only be directed towards adult consumers and is not designed to engage or appeal to youth…All our marketing is done responsibly, in strict accordance with our International Marketing Principles, local laws, legislation and platform policie …We only use influencers in some countries where it’s permitted, and social media platform policies allow.”

This shows the power of the country arbitrage game. In addition, you see them saying one thing in their public relations, while doing the opposite.

  • Their products are presented as cool and aspirational in youth-focused advertising campaigns
  • Even though nicotine is not allowed to be promoted on Instagram, they’ve paid influencers to do just that
  • Glo, BAT’s new heated tobacco product, was the sponsor of concerts for bands that are popular among teenagers.
  • BAT also sponsored an e-sports tournament
  • Use of free samples, that according to sources, have been given to underage boys and girls.

Big Tobacco has updated it’s advertising for the digital age. Velo, also called Lyft in some markets, are nicotine pouches you put in your mouth. A data analysis by the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids showed that Facebook and Instagram posts regarding Velo:

  • 40 influencers used Velo hashtags
  • Viewed 13.1 million times
  • Potential audience of 181 million

They also advertised on TikTok with an #OpenTheCan ad campaign. Interestingly, since the pouches fly under the radar of most countries tobacco laws and advertising regulations. This is because they only contain nicotine, and not tobacco itself.  

An example of an Instagram influencer paid promotional post for Velo nicotine pouches in Pakistan.
An influencer’s post in Kenya with #LYFT.

These stats don’t lie. What BAT is doing is clearly working is bringing new customers in.

Let’s switch gears to look at how governments are fighting against this influence. In June 2019, the WHO assessed the results of the FCTC, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, the multilateral treaty that had been adopted in 2003. While they claim some successes in helping smaller countries especially, it is interesting to note some of their findings.

“Since the FCTC’s entry into force, the tobacco industry has initiated and supported litigation challenging various tobacco control measures around the world. Stakeholders in Brazil noted that every legal tobacco control measure taken towards protecting the health of its population has been challenged in court.”

Every measure challenged in court! In other words, they don’t let a single attack go undefended. They don’t concede a single inch of ground. When you understand that regulations hurt their profits, it makes sense that the lawyers are the biggest defense.

This report discusses tobacco industry influence so much so that they abbreviate it TII. They admit that in Bangladesh, “provisions of the [Smoking and Usage of Tobacco Products Control] Act were diluted due to TII.” Or in Sri Lanka that although legislation was drafted in 1999, it wasn’t passed until 2006 due to TII.

They state, “TII continues to be a major obstacle to progress on global tobacco control.”

Big Tobacco is still up to their old game using mostly the same old tricks but updated for the 21st century. Their best bet is for no one to remember this history. Forget what happened. Forget these tactics.

Robert Proctor, a historian who worked for the DOJ case, said the industry “used to control the science and now they’re trying to control the history.”

Add this to their diversification into other products, covered next, and you’ll see why Big Tobacco hasn’t gone anywhere.

Key Takeaways on Up to Old and New Tricks

  • Big Tobacco is still advertising to youth, especially with tobacco-free but nicotine containing products that skirt around tobacco advertising laws.
  • They’ve updated their marketing to include social media campaigns from Instagram to TikTok, paying influencers, and marketing at concerts and sporting events.
  • These tactics are hooking a new generation of youth many of which never learned about what Big Tobacco had done in the past.
  • Despite the WHO’s treaty, the tobacco industry continues to fight at every single turn, in many cases quite successfully.

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